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Underlying this attention, however, is a basic, often unstated assumption about the principal cause of the North Atlantic hegemony: that the change in the axis of Europe's internal and intercontinental trade was a result of geographical discoveries that opened up new horizons and opportunities for trade which were most accessible to the coastal nations of northern Europe and became the source of their economic growth.2 In contrast to Europe's monumental discovery of the rest of creation in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,8 all of the internal factors-technology, organization, and so forth-assume a distinctly secondary role in our understanding of the northward and westward shift in the European trade pattern, and ultimately, in our understanding of economic development. Those factors explain how certain regions or nations capitalized on newly-found advantages while others let the new opportunities pass them by, but always within the context of the "natural" advantage of favorable situation in the new routes of oceangoing commerce.
The rise of Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London, and the contemporaneous decline of the Mediterranean both follow hard on the heels of the great explorations and the creation of early colonial empires. This lends chronological buttressing to the causal bridge between the Age of Discovery and the commercial and industrial burgeoning of northern Europe. However clear and evident the sequence of events may seem, a second look at this durable interpretation should not be unwelcome.
Ibis article begins to explore the possibility that aggressive competition in old markets, not natural proxmity to new markets, is the true explanation for the rise of the North Atlantic community the hypothesis the authors acknowledge, but never fully come to terms with the fact that there was precious little novelty in the commercial practices of the North Atlantic traders in {he 1600's that would have been unfam iiar to Mediterranean businessmen in the fifteenth century; see Charles Wilson, 'Trade, Society, and the State," Cambridge Economic History of Europe (New York, 1967), IV, 490.
2 For example, Violet Barbour wrote, "Geographically, early modem capitalism extended its radius, especially in the penetration of northern and eastern Europe, and in beginning the exploitation of other continents to which the age of discovery had opened seaways. In western Europe trade was slowly shifting from its ancient seats commanding the Mediterranean highway to northern and western ports facing the North Sea or the Atlantic Ocean." (Capitalism in Amsterdam in the 17th Century [Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963 reprint], p. 11.) 8 Are we now less impressed by the oceanic discoveries than was Adam Smith, who wrote: "The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind"? (The Wealth of Nations, Cannan edition, [New York, 1937 reprint, p. 590.) with the moment in time when Venice was the most advanced industrial city in Europe. It was a world leader in those few crafts that could be called "industrial" at that time-naval construction, textiles, glassmaking, and some chemical and metallurgical industries. It was also Europe's chief technical repository; early modem mercantilist powers were all technological predators on Venice's erstwhile exclusive methods.6 In the middle years of the 1500's, Venice and Antwerp were both enjoying great commercial success. This is an important juncture for it marks a moment when the North Atlantic trade routes and centers were developing, but not to the detriment of the old market areas. The seventeenth century, especially the years 1620-1660, saw the establishment of the Atlantic hegemony. Although the victory was to the North, the theater of economic war was the Mediterranean market.
Direct evidence which can be said to establish firmly the primary importance of the Mediterranean market for north European producers is not easily found. For England, Ralph Davis' analysis of the London port books shows that by the mid-1600's the Mediterranean had become the single largest destination for London's exported goods ( enough to be the key commodity. The non-European trade, which one would think to be so important a factor in the rise of the North Atlantic trading community, accounted for a mere tenth of exports from London and probably not much more from the outports. As late as the second decade of the eighteenth century the value of English exports to the American colonies averaged about ?400,000-500,000-about half the value of Mediterranean-bound exports in the 1660's. 
Can shipping statistics help us to isolate the major markets of the seventeenth century? I fear not. One problem is the scarcity of available statistics; another is the unreliability of those which we possess. For example, there is a well-known "calculation" of 1634 which shows the annual traffic of the Dutch fleet by destination: it indicates shipments to the Mediterranean of 160,000 Last, which was 12 percent of total trade volume and more than twice the volume of the East India trade.13 In 1915, however, Walther Vogel dismissed the complete "calculation" as a fiction.14 Vogel sought instead to estimate the total carrying capacity of the Dutch merchant fleet which he found to be on the order of 300,000 Last or 600,000 English tons. He estimated that the Mediterranean fleet was equal to about 13 percent of total Dutch tonnage, second only in size to the Baltic fleet.15 According to Vogel the Atlantic fleet had half the number of ships and two-thirds the carrying capacity of the Mediterranean fleet. His figures, however, compounded of equal measures of inference and guesswork, cannot be held in very high regard.
Other problems stand in the way of deriving much useful information from shipping records. The early seventeenth century was an age of tradition marked by rapid increases in the efficiency of ocean transport relative to overland carriage. Still, a significant portion of the intracontinental traffic took inland routes, and comparing shipping statistics alone would omit this traffic. Moreover, when shipping is measured by tonnage, the importance of routes in which cheap and bulky commodities predominate is overvalued, and comparisons based upon tonnages thus bear little relation to the value of trade. Ralph Davis has shown that at the end of the 1600's only 18 percent of English ships were engaged in the trade with southern Europe, far less than the Americas trade which accounted for a massive 80,000 tons or 38 percent of English foreign shipping. But in tenrs of the value of trade, the exports to southern Europe were 46 percent greater than those to the Western Hemisphere.' IlTe point of Davis' demonstration is that statistics of trade values are no measure of the relative importance of various trades to the shipping industry. The reverse is also true: shipping statistics are not very helpful for assessing the relative importance of northern Europe's various commercial relations. The behavior of industrial enterprises, I think, offers a better hope.
THE PATIEN OF INCURSION
The first stage of the Northern incursion in the Mediterranean began at the height of Venetian industrial fortunes in the latter sixteenth century, as craftsmen, lured by fabulous offers of instant wealth as payment for teaching their techniques, began to leave the Serenissima for foreign parts. The problem was not new to Venice, which had always been faced with such threats; but only in the early 16Ws did the emigration of technical experts take on massive proportions. All the basic industries of the Venetian export sector were forced to share their exclusive techniques with nascent foreign industries, as master craftsmen were lured away. Of these episodes, none is more indicative than that of the Murano glass workers who were more isolated by lagoon and language from the world at large than most Venetian workers; suddenly in the early seventeenth century they issued from their smoky factories to be installed in every corner of western Europe and even the New World.'L7 Their exploits became a matter of international diplomatic concern as the Republic sought to thwart the renegades while foreign interests, public and private, protected their presence abroad. One erstwhile Murano master, under contract to the English chartered glass monopoly, was reported to be earning as much in a day as an average Venetian master-builder made in a week. ' Despite these problems Venice still had certain advantages. As an industrial power it was the most diversified and most technically advanced city-economy in the sixteenth century. Its reputation for high quality was a strong selling point, and, in the Mediterranean market, locational advantages, and established routes for reaching both supplies of raw materials and selling outlets made it a classic mature economy."
In the early 16ws northern manufacturers encouraged the transplanting of Venetian craft techniques and began exporting their new products to the south LTey practiced all forms of smuggling i order to evade tariffs, and to gain admittance to markets (such as Venice itself) that normally forbade their entry. Also, smuggling enabled conterfeit merchandise to pass undetected into the marketplace. Many thousands of pseudo-Venetian cloths came onto the selling tables from most unlikely places of origin.
The chief stratagem of cloth smugglers was to imitate typical Venetian signs and marks on the head and the selvage of the bolt. These signs were supposed to guarantee the quality and origin of the cloth. Imitation Venetian cloths were hidden inside bales of panni bass, crude country woolens, or, on occasion, they were carried into port as permissible foreign cloths with appropriate mark- 28 Here we see that before accrediting the Reed/North/Thomas argument, which isolates transaction costs differentials as a source of North Atlantic economic growth, some measure of the reduced costs of using the market will have to be offered in evidence. It seems clear, at this point, that differences in tax policy alone, stemming from differences in institutional background, go further in explaining the relative noncompetitiveness of the Venetians than any differences in transaction costs or market (iffciency. 
Rapp
Venetian labor costs, and the taxes on production that weighed so heavily on domestic producers. Foreign soapmakers used similar tactics: luxury soap from Genoa and Leghorn with fake Venetian trademarks flooded the Mediterranean.26 Likewise, glassware, favon de Venise, came to replace the genuine article in France and elsewhere. We learn from reports on smuggling and counterfeit that the Venetian market was under fire during the comfortable years before 1620 when production was at near record highs. Even during these last years of the trade monopoly, it was reasoned that a foreign wool merchant could undersell Venice by about 15 percent with no other advantage than duty-free access to Spanish wool and the lack of restriction against making top-quality cloth with Spanish wool rather than scarce English wool.Y' Also noteworthy during these crucial years is the fact that the smuggling and counterfeit operations often involved the transmission of contraband throughout the Venetian mercantile community. The implied connivance of Venetian tradesmen and wholesalers suggests the pressure for shortcutting domestic production costs, even at risk of great penalty.28
The problems of counterfeit cloth, smuggling, and imitative design intensified after the turn of the century when the English trade in the Levant became a 'mercantilistes dream." In 1635 the Venetian bailiff at Constantinople observed:
. . . the English devote their attention to depriving our people of the little trade that remains to them in the mart of Constantinople, as they imitate Venetian cloth and make borders after the Venetian manner; they also have plates and wheels sent from their country, and although there is no market for these it shows that they are trying to imitate everything and despoil our merchants of all of the trade they have left. 
And again the following year:
Among the bales of cloth I noticed some which [the English] call "antiVenetian" which means in imitation and for the destruction of ours, a prejudice which is increased by many other advantages which the English have in trading in these parts, both from the Capitulation which they have with the Porte and because their trading is done by means of a company . . . They are not only exempt from half the duties which may be remitted to them, but they have a thousand chances of smuggling, which assuredly they do not miss.31
These are examples of commercial reporting which, after the Venetian fashion, were quite accurate in tone and content. They should not be mistaken for mere grousing or excuse-making. "AntiVenetian cloth" was exactly that. an important middle range of fabrics, and the distinction between "old" and 'new" draperies must often have been clearer to the eye of the English customs agent than to consumers in foreign parts. West-country clothiers shifted from making the old unfinished white broadcloths to colored broadcloths whose weight and density of weave were much flimsier than that of the old whites. On the other hand, bays, stammets, and minikins, technically not "woolens" but new draperies, were sometimes fulled, teaseled, and sheared to resemble broadcloths.Y6 Often these fabrics, which were sold under the exotic new drapery nomenclature, were no more than lightweight versions of old types of woolen cloth, freshly labelled for foreign consumption. Although the new draperies poured into the southern marketplaces, they were not, strictly speaking, the "anti- The result of this new attitude toward competition was a fivefold expansion in the production of new draperies between 1600 and 1640.3 Further, even as the sale of fine white cloths all but expired, the export of finished cheap broadcloths grew to such a degree that throughout the second half of the century 20,000 dyed and dressed cloths on average were sent annually to the Mediterranean, which soon surpassed Holland and Germany as a market for English cloth.88 It was this English explosion of inexpensive and imitative woolens that destroyed the Venetian woolen cloth industry. Corresponding to the failure of production so well analysed by Domenico Sella89 was a collapse of employment in the woolworkers guilds from a total of about 3,300 guildsmen in 1595 (about 10 percent of the total city work force) to fewer than 800 in 1690 ( in cases of trade rivalry from the earliest times to the modern period.41 Modern international trade theory, however, is not very helpful as an analytic framework for dealing with trade rivalry. The theory of the firm, with its emphasis on sellers' competition, holds greater promise for understanding commercial behavior, even on an international leveL International commerce, particularly when there is competition among sellers, involves antagonistic relations. This is an idea that had much currency in the seventeenth century, and, although it has fallen out of favor with economists since the time of Smith and Ricardo, it is a notion which the business world has never really abandoned. Making the jump from the firm as the unit of competition to the nation as the unit of competition is therefore not a difficult proposition, at least for the case at hand.
Both in Europe's old and new industrial centers, products for international trade were manufactured by many small firms. Only in a few cases, either because of patent or chartered monopoly privileges or because of the need for large-scale physical plant, did the production of commercial staples become very concentrated. Freedom to act independently in the market, however, did not often accompany even the most fractionalized industry. nTe regulations imposed by guilds, and more often, by governments, enforced great uniformity upon producers within an administrative region, whether city or nation-state. The effect of specific duties or subsidies, together with state regulation of wages and piece-rates, greatly reduced the prospect of price competition between firms of the same state engaged in producing goods for international trade. Equally important were the state and guild regulations of quality, which defined in great measure the physical characteristics of output, from the cheapest to the most opulent of commodities. Non-price competi- , 1920) . The trade rvalry which is, I suspect, most familiar to economic historians is the challege to Great nitain's dominion over world trade in the last third of the nineteenth century, on which the literature is notably abundant. Both of these episodes share with our present case study of the early modern era the elements of theft of method, counterfeit of brand-markings and design, c oat pricing, the use of quality as a cost variable, and other leser leitmotif.
fm, was the relevant unit of competition in early modern international trade. The historian's terminology of national types-"English cloth," "French woolens,' "Venetian glass"-is not merely a convenience, it is a fact.
The commercial environment of the Mediterranean during the crucial years was one of few competitive units. In the 1630's the western trade in Constantinople was effectively divided among England, France, Venice, and the Low Countries. Each competing nation carried to the market a wide variety of goods, but for simplicity we can restrict ourselves to a consideration of the principal article of early modern manufacture, wool cloth. When one speaks of textiles in the pre-modern period, it is as if to speak of steel or automobiles today: the fate of the industry is of major consequence in and of itself; there are widespread linkages to other industries which share its fate, and it is a model for the fate of even unrelated enterprises. Here were myriad varieties of woolen cloth ranging from heavy luxurious broadcloths to light utilitarian mixed cloths, but within each type the quality of the product, both in terms of its outward characteristics and wearability, varied from country to country. The products of various national origins were differentiated by brand name, state cachet, and characteristics of design and dye. 42 In general terms, we may distinguish between two types of competitors: the mature economy-the established seller such as Venice in the early 1600's-and the developing economy, the challenger (England, for example). The key characteristics of the mature competitor were: industrial and commercial leadership marked by a large share of the market and a substantial ability to set the prices of exported goods and services; high labor costs (relative to newer entrants); the presence of rigidities fostered by guilds, government, or merely by the opportunities for inefficiency that monopoly power can encourage; and high levels of quality and price. By contrast, developing nations enjoy relatively low factor costs and high effim ciency (an absence of rigidities), but lack consumer familiarity or 42 For example, Venetian woolens were grouped under official grades of quality. For each grade of cloth, producers were liited to a stipulated type of wool, a specific density of weave, and a few specific dyestuffs. The purpose was to prevent a mix of cheap and costly characteristics in a single fabric, which might confuse or deceive consumers. Cloth that failed to meet these regulations could not be sold as Venetian cloth and manufacturers who sought to contravene the regulations were liable to prosecution. Other nations were less rigorous about quality control, particularly when their commercial interests were best served by selling cheaper goods. confidence in their products. In order to penetrate the market and compete with well-known products of high quality, the tactics employed by newcomers are entirely familiar: they borrow the preexisting techniques, and produce cheaper versions of products to be sold in the old market.
To return to the analogy of the firm, the circumstance we are dealing with is monopolistic competition-defined here as competition among several individual competitive units purveying nonhomogeneous products.43 Commercial concourse among nations (as among firms in most industries) almost always involves a limited group of competitive units, differentiated products, and some degree of individual power over the market price. International trade rivalries are characteristically akin to what has been called "warfare with differentiated products."44 This describes the pricing behavior of a competitive unit designed to drive the demand curve of a close competitor below the latter's average cost curve at every point. If competitor A can sustain production under these conditions and survive financially by dint of lower average costs, greater financial resources, or an inherently cheaper product, B will be partly or completely removed from the market. In order to overcome the resistance of consumers to an unknown product, the new competitor (A) must sell at a price drastically lower than that of the established competitor (B). To oust the mature seller completely from the marketplace it is necessary for the newcomer, with his lower average costs, to dictate a price that will drive down the demand for the old product below all points of the average cost curve of the mature 48 This is the take-off point of all imperfect competition theory. Its analytical consequence is that the product for a given industry ceases to be a datum and becomes an economic variable whose characteristics are part of the competitive spiel. In international trade rivalry, however, a variation wi often happen. Products are differentiated, but the intention of entraiits is to minimize the subjective differences between their products and the wares of older manufacturers. Differentiation, in other words, is not entirely by choice. If it were possible for an entrant to be entirely successful in a campaign of disguise (so that subjectively the new and old products were indistinguishable to consumers), then both producers would face a single demand curve. The challenger (A), operating under lower cost conditions, might drive a rival (B) entirely from the market without incurring losses by dictating a price below the minimum point of B's average cost curve. Failing the desideratum of homogeneous goods, may achieve a partially equivalent result under conditions of product heterogeneity. The determinants of As ability to control B's market share are the absolute differences in cost structure between the two competitive units and the cross-elasticity of demand for the two products, the latter being a function of A's abilities at counterfeit. 44 seller. This is what distinguishes "economic warfare" from mere price competition. At the outset, the more favorable cost structure of the entrant gives that nation a pricing advantage, but experience shows that this is not enough to vanquish the established producer. In order to reach a large enough price advantage the quality of the product is reduced. It is no accident that the goods of new entrants are always cheap and shoddy by comparison to the former standards of the market. This is due neither to lack of skill nor to inattention; treating quality as a cost variable is a necessary device for success in trade rivalry. As Alexander Gerschenkron has pointed out, developing nations are invariably accused of slavish imitation in technique and design,4 and it is equally true that new competitors are always accused of making junk. Aggressors in international trade have discovered and rediscovered the fact that by manufacturing articles of the poorest materials and the minimum necessary workmanship, a gulf in prices between old and new competitors can be attained to the great detriment of the former. It is not axiomatic that when challenged in this fashion, the mature economy will fail to respond in kind. But it does seem that the longer the old competitor held sway alone the less likely such a reaction becomes. In the 1600's Venice could not hastily abandon four centuries of successful trading in manufactured goods produced under the highest quality standards. Whereas individual Venetian merchants and craftsmen were often willing to cut corners to stay alive in the market, the government, which was the supreme arbiter of production methods for export-directed commodities, tolerated no compromise with quality control. The effect of these stiff scruples about quality disallowed virtually any prospect of cost and price-cutting by Venetian manufacturers.
For example, soon after the English successfully reduced the cost of dyeing their cloths by use of "bow dyeing" (to dye cloth a scarlet color made from cochineal mordantized with pewter in nitric acid), Venetian dyers were experimenting with orchil, an inexpensive vegetable dyestuff to replace costly crimson for coloring silk. But 45 Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective," in the collection of the same name (New York, Praeger, 1965), p. 8. On the general question of quality reduction it is worth noting that in most cases economists, unlike business decisionmakers, are inclined to treat low quality as an effect of deteriorated efficiency rather than as a controllable variable cost; for example, Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass., 1970). even though the appearance of the cloth was good the government (not the silk-dyers' guildl) rejected this process, which might have reduced dyeing costs by two-thirds. Venice never abandoned the old, expensive dyeing methods, even when, by 1660, fine Gobelin woolens were being made with the newer, cheaper methods.4"
The best indication that the analysis of trade rivalries is basically the stuff of monopolistic competition at the international level is that differentiation of product by appearance and trade-marks plays a large role in struggles for commercial supremacy. As Chamberlin insisted, patents and trade-marks have both monopolistic and competitive aspects. "Each makes a product unique in certain respects; this is its monopolistic aspect. Each leaves room for other commodi- Although Sir Josiah Child's observations on the subject of quality (in A New Discourse on Trade, first edition, London, 1690) come a bit late for our purposes, they are nevertheless instructive: All our laws that oblige our people to the making of strong, substantial (and as we call it, loyal) cloth, of a certain length, breadth, and weight, if they were duly put in execution, would in my opinion do more hurt than good, because the humours and fashions of the world change, and at some times in some places (as now in most) slight, cheap, light cloth will sell more plentifully and better than that which is heavier, stronger, and truer wrought; and if we intend to have the trade of the world, we must imitate the Dutch, who make the worst as well as the best of all manufactures, that we may be in a capacity of serving all markets and all humours. In order to insure that these goods would compete fully with southern manufactures northern producers faithfully imitated the style and brand markings of goods that were well-established in the marketplace, to the extent that this could be done without added cost. Counterfeit and smuggling went hand in hand with these practices. This combination of tactics bears strong resemblance to other historical instances of trade rivalry and is best described in terms of an imperfect competition model.
What is the importance of this approach for understanding the commercial rivalry of the seventeenth century? Simply that the explanation of north European economic growth is more clearly related to competitive success in established markets, not merely to changing trade routes. Both economic logic and historical evidence suggests that the competitive success of the North Atlantic was founded on the abilities of producers to reduce costs in three ways: by capitalizing on factor-cost advantages; by using product variation to reduce the quality-related costs of manufactures; and (undeniably) by innovation in shipping to reduce transport costs. Ile last of these is universally recognized as important, but cannot by itself fully explain the success of the northerners in the southern market.57 Since for both the Dutch and the English, Levantine hegemony was a prelude to expanded trade empire, it seems clear that something more than fluits, routes, and seamanship was involved in both the prelude and the main act.
THE CONSEQUENCES
The transformation of the English commercial mentality from the ethic of "selling dear" to a keener, more combative sort of competitive posture appropriately conveys the new nature of trade, not only in textiles, but in all export industries, and not only for England, but for all of the rising powers of the seventeenth century. Although the Dutch were tied to less distant trades in the North and Baltic Seas to a greater degree than the English, it was their lead that the English often followed in the exploitation of distant markets, until Holland in its turn was deprived of its maritime supremacy. Although more systematic study will surely be necessary to confirm our tentative conclusion, such evidence as we now have strongly suggests that the rise of England as an industrial and commercial center in the seventeenth century rested upon the conquest of the , 1973) , p. 351. Of course, the Dutch and the English managed increasingly to convey larger amounts with an increase of security wile employing a smaller crew. Still there is no evidence to suggest that the differential in transportation costs between north and south was so great as to allow northerners to underpice southerners in the southern marketplace, ceteris paribus. We need to remember also that transportation services were very much in the international public domain, so that advantages owing to the development of new techniques were not easily confined to the ex usive benefit of the innovating nations. In fact, it would seem that little effort was made to restrict the spread ofmodern ship technology in the 1600's. The Dutch were primarily responsible for productivity-boosHng innovations in ship manufacture and they readily sold ships to their rivals, the English. Both the Dutch and English in turn willingly became purveyors to the southern fleets. By the early 1600's, large proportions of the merchant fleets of both Genoa and Venice were foreign-built, mostly in Holland and England. See Lane "Venetian Shipping," p. 42, and Navires et constructeurs, ch. xii; and Luciana Gatti, "Compravendita di imbarcazioni mercantile a Genova (1503-1645)," in Guerra e commercio nell'evoluzione delta marina genovese tra XV e XVII secolo (Genoa, Centro per la storia della tecnica in Italia del Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 1973), II, 174-179. southern market, and more precisely, upon the elimination of Mediterranean rivals in industry and trade.
What then was left for Venice? Insofar as commerce and manufacturing are concerned, the answer is: not much. Of her major export industries, only the luxury silk industry remained in any semblance of past condition. Employment in export-related occupations diminished from a peak of about 45 percent of the work force in gulds in 1595 to 33 percent by the end of the 1600's, which was exactly the proportion that prevailed in the 1530's before the great rise of Venetian industry-a retrogression of 170 years in the economic structure of the city.58 Her carrying trade was blasted and the port was reduced in status from the foremost international emporium to a regional harbor. Venice's commercial presence m foreign markets, both Levantine and North Atlantic, evaporated. Marked reductions occurred in the output of woolens, ships, soap, printed matter, and metal manufactures.59 The aristocratic government's backward outlook about quality and taxation changed little during the century.
Yet remarkably, Venice had sufficient flexibility to adjust to her new role without experiencing a fall in the real wage or in population. The "Malthusian trap" did not clamp down on Venice. Midcentury population was at pre-1630 plague levels and indications are that the real wage grew slightly over the course of the 1600's. To put it another way, Venice did not decline in absolute terms.00
The Venetian adjustment to commercial failure was largely structural. That is to say, the occupational distribution of the city shifted gradually from the export-industrial sector to the domestic service sector without major dislocations in unemployment or aggregate income. Membership in the guilds was greater in 1690 than in 1595 (22,504 in 1595; 24,000 in 1690) ." The construction industry, retail- 60 Rapp, Industry and Economic Decline, ch. v. 61 Ibid., ch. iii. These figures refer to those guilds that were subject to conscription for galley crewmen by the Naval Personne Administration, representing about ing, and food services all grew substantially during the years of crisis to compensate for losses in the export sector.02 During those years a boom in public building and in tourism began. Of secondary importance was Venice's expanded interest in the terraferma. The mainland became a larger contributor to the fisc, as indicated above (Table 2) , and city-based investment in the country grew tremendously in these years, although the regional income consequences of this are far from clear.
The Venetian economy after 1700 was a changed economy, yet its level of prosperity was no lower than when it was the center of the Western world." In this respect Venice does not accurately represent the Mediterranean at large, whose decline for the most part was real and absolute. Plagues, wars, pirates, backward guilds and governing classes were no strangers to the Mediterranean industrial and commercial scene even before the challenge of the northern competitors, so that they cannot be responsible for the decline. Neither was the decline, whether relative or absolute, self-induced, except in the sense that the traditional rulers of the southern trade had become too habit-ridden to react quickly to the assault on their customary primacy. The new factor that put an end to the Mediterranean hegemony and set Italy into decline was the incursion of the Dutch, French, and English, who assumed control of world trade by conquering the established market with traditional products and combative marketing practices. Although it is true that the creation of regular sea-trade routes between Europe and the rest of the inhabited world was a sixteenth century achievement, the commercial value of this triumph of navigation did not come to be of great consequence until long after the North Atlantic hegemony was a firm fact. ' 
